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Abstract. Given oracle access to a Neural Network (NN), it is possi-
ble to extract its underlying model. We here introduce a protection by
adding parasitic layers which mostly keep unchanged the underlying NN
while complexifying the task of reverse-engineering. Our countermeasure
relies on approximating the identity mapping with a Convolutional NN.
We explain why the introduction of new parasitic layers complexifies
the attacks. We report experiments regarding the performance and the
accuracy of the protected NN.
1 Introduction
Neural Networks with high accuracy require a carefully selected architecture
and a long training on a large database. Thus, NN models’ architecture and
parameters are often considered intellectual property. Moreover, the knowledge
of both the architecture and the parameters make adversarial attacks – among
other kinds of attacks – easier: an attacker can easily generate small input noise
that is undetectable by the human eye but still changes the model’s predictions.
Several papers [4,14,15,10] have exploited the fact that a ReLU Neural Net-
work (NN) is a piecewise linear function to extract its underlying model. Indeed,
hyperplanes – where the RELU NN is linear – split the model’s input space, and
recovering the formed boundaries enables its extraction.
Here, we show how to modify the naturally induced division of the input
space by inserting parasitic layers between the NN layers. Our parasitic layers are
going to approximate the identity function, thus leaving the flow of data within
the victim NN mostly unchanged, while disrupting the geometry accessible for
extraction.
After finishing this introduction, we recall the aforementioned extraction of
RELU NN in Sec. 2. We show in Sec. 3, following [19], how to approximate the
identity through a Convolutional NN (CNN). We then describe our protection
proposal in Sec. 4. Sec. 6 reports our experiments regarding the deterioration of
performances and accuracy due to the addition of parasitic layers.
1.1 Background
Today, Neural Networks (NNs) are used to perform all kinds of tasks, ranging
from image processing [17] to malware detection [11]. Neural Networks are al-
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gorithms that, given an input x, compute an output o usually corresponding to
either a classification or a probability. NNs are organized in layers. Each layer
contains a set of neurons. Neurons of a given layer are computed based on a
subset from the previous layer’s parameters and parameters called weights.
There are different types of layers. Among those are:
– Fully connected layers: Each neuron from a layer li is connected to all neurons
from layer li+1. Thus, a neuron η
i
k in a layer li is computed as follows:
ηi =
∑n
j=1 η
i−1
j w
i
j where {ηi−1j }j are the n neurons from the previous layer
and {wj}j are the layer’s weights.
– Convolutional layers: These layers compute a convolution between one – or
several – filter F and windows from the input, as follows:
Oi,j =
h∑
k=1
w∑
l=1
Xi+k,j+l · Fk,l
The elements of the filter are the weights of the layer. The number of filters
is the number of output channels. An input can have several channels. For
instance, in image processing, the input of a model is usually an image with
three channels, corresponding to the RGB colors.
While the different layers of an NN are linear, each layer is followed by an
activation function, applied to all of the layer’s neurons. The activation function
is used to activate or, on the contrary, deactivate some neurons. The most pop-
ular activation function is ReLU, defined as the maximum between 0 and the
neuron.
NNs only composed of fully connected layers are called Fully Connected
Networks (FCNs), while those which are mainly composed of convolutional layers
are called Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs).
A ReLU NN is a NN constituted by linear layers followed by ReLU activation
functions.
Let us note that another common layer type is the pooling layer, whose goal
is to reduce the dimensionality. The attacks we consider do not take them into
account, as they are not piece-wise linear. For this reason, we also put ourselves
in the context where pooling layers are not considered.
1.2 Related Works
Different kinds of reverse engineering approaches have been introduced. Batina
et al. recover NNs’ structure through side channels, i.e. by measuring leakages
like power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, and reaction time [1]. These
measurement attacks are common for embedded devices (e.g. smartcards). Fault
attacks, which are also a typical threat to smartcards, are transposed to find NN
models in [3]. A weaker approach where the victim NN shares its cache memory
with the attacker in the cloud is taken in [7,18]. The protections to thwart these
attacks are related to the victim NN implementation. As we here consider oracle
access attacks, our countermeasures have to modify the NN’s architecture itself.
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A more detailed explanation of the attacks [4,14,15,10] is given in the next
Section.
It should be noted that the abstract model of NNs that we are looking at
here has been introduced by [16] while in the different context of adversarial
examples. While this is, here, out-of-scope, the application of our idea to thwart
adversarial examples seems intriguing.
2 Extraction of Neural Network Models
Several attacks [4,14,15,10] have managed to recover a ReLU NN’s weights. These
attacks rely on the fact that ReLU is piecewise linear.
The attack model in [14], [10] and [15] is as follows:
– The victim model corresponds to a piecewise linear function
– The attacker can query the model
– The attacker aims at recovering the weights (and, in some cases [15], the
architecture) of the victim model
Furthermore, [15] also assumes that the attacker doe snot know the structure
(i.e. the number of neurons per layer) of the victim NN. In the case of [4], the
authors assumed that the attacker had access to the architecture, but not the
weights. However, the authors mentioned their belief this was not a necessary
assumption, even though they did not prove it in their paper.
This attack model corresponds to the case of online services, for instance,
where users can query a model and get the output, but they do not have access
to the architecture and parameters of the model.
[4] is the only paper so far that proves the practicability of its attack for more
than 2 layers of a given neural network, even though the theory of [14] applies to
arbitrarily deep neural networks. Moreover, [4] provides a much higher accuracy
with much fewer queries to the victim model.
Let V(η, x) denote the input of neuron η, before applying the ReLU activation
function, when the model’s input is x. For a given neuron η at layer l, let us
define its critical point as follows:
Definition 1. When, for an input x, V(η, x) = 0, the neuron η is said to be at
a critical point. Moreover, x is called a witness of η being at a critical point.
Finding at least one witness for a neuron η enables the attacker to compute η’s
critical hyperplane.
Definition 2. A bent critical hyperplane for a neuron η is the piecewise linear
boundary B such that V(η, x) = 0 for all x ∈ B.
All three attacks recover the weights of each layer thanks to the following
steps:
1. Identify critical points and deduce the critical hyperplanes
2. Filter out critical points from later layers
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3. Deduce the weights up to the sign and up to an isomorphism
4. Find the weight signs
Although the way critical points are found and filtered out differ from an article
to the other, all methods use the piecewise linearity of the ReLU activation. The
main element in those attacks resides in the fact that each neuron is associated
to one bent critical hyperplane (that exists because of the ReLU activation func-
tion), corresponding to the neuron’s change of sign. That hyperplane’s equation
is what enables the attacker to deduce the weights.
Let us detail the attack in [4], as it is the most accurate and requires the
fewest queries to the victim model so far.
Finding critical points The attacker chooses a random line l from the input
space. Looking for non linearities through binary search in a large interval in that
line enables the attacker to find several critical points (see Fig. 1). However, the
Fig. 1. Hyperplanes for three neurons in the first layer. The dotted line l enables the
attacker to find the critical points pointed by the arrows (image taken from [4])
attacker knows neither what neurons these critical points are witnesses for, nor
the said neurons’ layer. Neurons from the first layer yield unbent hyperplanes,
while those in the following layers are bent by the several previous ReLUs (see
Fig. 2).
Recovering the weights up to a sign As seen before, the attacker has a set
of witnesses for neurons in all layers. She can then carry out a differential attack
in order to recover the weights and biases up to a sign.
Let us describe the attack on a simple case where the model only has one
hidden layer, and the input vector space is χ = RN . Let x∗ be a witness for
neuron η∗ being at a critical point. Define {ei} as the set of standard basis
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Fig. 2. Hyperplanes are bent by boundaries from previous layers (image taken from
[4])
vectors of χ. The attacker computes:
αi+ =
∂f(x)
∂ei
∣∣∣∣∣
x=x∗+ei
and αi− =
∂f(x)
∂ei
∣∣∣∣∣
x=x∗−ei
Then, because the activation function is ReLU(x) = max(0, x), we have that:
αi+ − αi− = ±A(1)j,i ·A(2]. Thus, by computing:
αi+ − αi+
α1+ − α1+
for all i, the attacker gets the weights up to a multiplicative scalar.
In the general case where the NN is deeper, and for a layer j, the attacker
computes second partial derivatives yi = {∂
2f
∂δ2i
} instead of the simple ones, where
the δi take random values. She then solves a system of equations: hi · w = yi,
where hi is the value of the previous layer – after the ReLU – for an input model
x∗ + δi. Let us note that the attacker does not know whether neuron η∗ is in
the current layer. She therefore solves the system of equations for all layers, and
only keeps the solution that appears most often. The biases can then easily be
deduced from the weights.
To differentiate critical points of the current layer from other critical points,
the differential attack is carried out on all the critical points and the attacker
filters out the wrong critical points by observing the resulting traces.
Recovering weight signs In this step, the attacker proceeds recursively. The
attacker has a set S of witnesses for unknown neurons (as found in the previous
step).
Let us suppose the attacker has managed to recover the correct model up
to layer j − 1, as well as the weights up to sign for layer j. Let us define the
polytope at layer j containing x as:
S = {x+ δ s.t. sign(V(η, x)) = sign(V(η, x+ δ))}
6 Herve´ Chabanne, Linda Guiga
Thus, this polytope corresponds to the open, convex subspace shaped by the
critical hyperspaces.
The attacker can easily filter out the critical points x from previous layers
since she already recovered the weights and biases up to layer j.
To filter out witnesses from layers deeper than j + 1, the attacker relies on
the fact that the polytopes of two distinct layers have a different shape with high
probability.
Finally, the attacker recovers the sign of the weights through brute force
using layer j + 1’s witnesses.
Thus, the attacker can recover the victim model’s parameters recursively
over the depth of the considered layer as described in the previous paragraphs.
Moreover, even though the number of queries is linear, the work required is
exponential, as explained in the previous paragraph.
3 Approximating the Identity thanks to CNNs
Our proposal is based on adding parasitic layers to the victim model, and for
those layers, we rely on a CNN approximating the identity. Even though the
identity mapping is one of the easiest mathematical functions, NNs, which are
intrinsically nonlinear, have a hard time simulating it. In fact, because of acti-
vation functions, NNs can only approximate the identity function, without ever
reaching it. However, the approximation reached can be accurate enough. We
will explain what this means in the next section.
The authors of [19] first observe that while both CNNs and FCNs could
approximate the identity on digits well when trained on three training examples
from the MNIST dataset [13], only CNNs generalize to examples outside of the
digits scope. Moreover, they state that this bias can still be observed when the
models are trained with the whole MINST training set.
In order to better characterize the bias, the authors take the worst case
scenario: they only train FCNs and CNNs on a single training example. Contrary
to what they expected, architectures that are not too deep manage some kind
of generalization: FCNs output noisy images for inputs that are not the training
example, while CNNs still manage to approximate the identity. Moreover, FCNs
tend to correlate more to the constant function than to the identity. The output
of CNNs’ correlation with the identity function decreases with a smaller input
size and a higher filter size.
The authors of [19] show – by providing possible filter values – that in their
case, if the input has n channels, 2n channels suffice to approximate the iden-
tity mapping. They also note that adding output featuremaps does help with
training. Moreover, they use 5× 5 filters for all their CNNs’ layers. Finally, they
explain that even though 20-layer CNNs can learn the identity mapping given
enough training examples, shallower networks learn the task faster and provide
a better approximation.
An example of approximated identity is given in Sec. 6.
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4 Our proposal
Let us consider a victim ReLU NN. The attack scenario described in Sec. 2 is
based on the bent critical hyperplanes induced by the ReLU functions in the
model. In [4], the bent hyperplanes are especially used in the case of expansive
NNs – i.e. for which a preimage does not always exist for a given value in the
output space –, in order to filter out witnesses that are not useful to the studied
layer. In order to make the attacker’s task more complex, we propose to add
artificial critical hyperplanes. Thus, adding artificial hyperplanes would make
the attack more complex: the attacker would have to filter out the artificial
hyperplanes as well as the other layers’ hyperplanes.
As explained in Sec. 3, CNNs can provide a good approximation of the iden-
tity given enough trainable examples. Moreover, they generalize well: with only
a single trainable example from the MNIST dataset, CNNs up to 5 layers deep
can still reach our target goal.
For this reason, we propose to add dummy hyperplanes through the insertion
of parasitic CNNs approximating the identity between two layers of the victim
model. Since CNNs approximate CNNs well, we only observe a very limited drop
in accuracy (see Sec. 6).
Remark 1 Note that we can think of a dynamic addition of parasitic CNNs
approximating the identity. For instance, considering a client-server architecture
where the server is making predictions; from a client query to another, different
parasitic CNNs can be added in random places of the server’s NN architecture
replacing the previous ones.
Furthermore, the small CNN we add does not act on all neurons. This yields
two advantages:
– The added CNN considered can be small, implying fewer computations dur-
ing inference
– We can add different CNNs to different parts of the input, to further increase
the difference in behavior between neurons
Fig. 3 shows an example of adding such an identity CNN between the first and
the second layer of an NN with only one hidden layer.
The CNN we add consists of two hidden layers, with 5× 5 filters. Indeed, as
recalled in Sec. 3, a CNN with few layers and 5×5 filters can already approximate
the identity on 28×28 inputs with a single training example. Thus, such a CNN
is well adapted to learning the identity mapping. When the CNN receives the
set of neurons from the considered layer, it first reshapes it into a square input
with one channel, so that it is adapted to convolutional layers.
Moreover, for the much harder task tackled by the authors of [19], for an
input with n channels, 2n channels in the intermediary layers are enough to get
a good approximation of the identity, even though more channels improve the
accuracy. Since we do not constrain ourselves to training our CNN with a single
example, we can limit the number of channels in the hidden layers to two –
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Input #1
Input #2
Input #3
Input #4
Input #5
Input #6
Input #7
Input #8
Identity
CNN
Output
Hidden
layer
Fig. 3. Neural Network with one hidden layer where a CNN approximating the identity
has been added to approximate the first fours input neurons
because we consider inputs with one channel. This enables us to minimize the
number of additional computations for the dummy layers, with only a slight drop
in the victim model’s accuracy.
5 Complexity of Extraction in the Presence of Parasitic
Layers
Adding a convolutional layer with k layers as described in the previous section
results in adding k layers to the architecture while keeping almost the same accu-
racy. If those k layers add critical hyperplanes, then the complexity of extraction
increases.
In this section, we consider a CNN added after the first layer in the victim
NN. We prove that in that case, the identity CNN does add hyperplanes with
high probability.
Let us suppose we add a CNN Identity layer that takes n × n inputs, and
the original input size is m. Let {Fi,j}1≤i≤k, 1≤j≤k be its associated filter. This
would result in the following weight matrix C:

Ci×n+j,(i+l)×n+j+h = Fl,h ∀1 ≤ i, j ≤ n− k + 1 and 1 ≤ l, h ≤ k
Ci,i = 1 ∀i ≥ (n− k + 1)× (n− k + 1)
Ci,j = 0 otherwise
Here, without loss of generality, we consider there is no padding.
This new layer adds at most n×n bent hyperplanes. This number decreases
if two neurons ηi and ηj share the same hyperplane.
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Let V(ηi, x) be the value of ηi before the activation function, if the model’s
input is x.
We need to consider two cases:
1. ηi and ηj are in different layers. Let us suppose that ηi’s layer is l and that
ηj ’s layer is l + 1. If the layers are not consecutive, the ηj ’s hyperplane is
bent by ReLUs from the layers in between, making the probability of the
two hyperplanes matching very low.
2. ηi and ηj are in the same layer
5.1 First case: ηi is on layer l and ηj is on layer l+ 1
Let us suppose that ηi is on the first layer, and ηj is on the second one. The
output z(x) of the first layer, for x ∈ χ is:
z(x) = A(1)x+ β(1)
where A(1) is supposed to be invertible. This is an assumption made in the con-
sidered attacks, as it does not imply any loss of generality. Indeed, the dimension
of the matrix can be reduced so as to remove the colinearities.
The output of the second layer is:
Out = C ·ReLU(z(x)) + β(2)
Thus, since A(1) is invertible, there exists a solution x∗ such that z(x∗) = V . If
we select V so that Vi ≥ 0 ∀i ≤ m, then V is not affected by the ReLU . We can
therefore select a vector V such that, letting k be the convolutional layer’s filter
size:
V(b jn c+h)×n+j%n+l = 0 ∀1 ≤ l, h ≤ k (where j%n means j modulo n)
except for one value i′ that is not ηi, where Vi′ = 1
Since this second layer is a convolutional one, β
(2)
i is the same for all i on a
given channel, denoted β. The window considered to compute ηj is zeroed out,
except for one value. The filter weight associated to that value needs to be −β
to nullify ηj . Since we can repeat the process for all values of the window that
are not ηi, all the filter weights except for that associated to ηi need to be −β
except for the one associated with ηi. This is not the case with high probability.
Thus, with high probability, ηi = 0 does not imply that ηj = 0.
For deeper layers, even though we cannot select any vector V , it is highly
unlikely for the following equation to happen:
zi(x) = 0 ⇐⇒ CjReLU(z(x) + β(2)) = 0
When ηi is not in the window used to compute ηj , it is even less likely to be the
case.
Therefore, two neurons on different layers are very likely to have different
critical hyperplanes.
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5.2 Second case: ηi and ηj are in the same layer
Let us suppose that ηi and ηj are in layer l. Let l be the first convolutional layer.
Moreover, let us suppose that the CNN is set after the victim model’s first layer.
Then l’s input is:
z(x) = ReLU(A(1)x+ β(1))
where x is the model’s input.
Let us also suppose, without loss of generality, that j > i. This means that
the windows used to compute the two neurons are not identical. With high
probability, one of the filter values associated with the disjoint window values is
nonzero. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, let us suppose, in what
follows, that F1,1 is such a filter value. Thus, in what follows, we suppose that
F1,1 6= 0.
Case where β = 0 : As explained before, we can find x∗ such that z(x∗)b in c×n+i%n =
1 and z(x∗)h = 0 otherwise. Since j > i, z(x∗)b in c×n+i%n is not in the window
used to compute ηj . In this case, ηi 6= 0 and ηj = 0. Thus, ηi and ηj do not
share the same critical hyperplane.
Case where β 6= 0 : If β 6= 0 , we cannot directly apply the previous reasoning.
Let x∗ be a witness for ηj being at a critical point. Let us show that we can find
an input x∗∗ such that ηj = 0 but ηi 6= 0.
If x∗ already satisfies this property, our work is done. Otherwise, x∗ is such
that ηi = ηj = 0. As explained before, there exists an input to the NN x
′ such
that (A(1) ·x′)b in c×n+i%n = a with a > 0 and (A(1) ·x′)h = 0 otherwise. Then, by
piecewise linearity of z, we have, for a large enough, that z(x∗+x′)b in c×n+i%n >
z(x∗)b in c×n+i%n. Moreover, for all other indices h, z(x
∗ + x′)h = z(x∗)h. Let us
consider x∗∗ = x∗ + x′. We have that zb in c×n+i%n is not in ηj ’s window, which
means that ηj remains unchanged and ηj = 0 when the NN’s input is x
∗∗. On
the other hand, ηi’s value changes since one of its window values changes and
F1,1 6= 0. Thus, ηi 6= 0. Therefore, we can indeed find x∗∗ such that ηj = 0 but
ηi 6= 0.
Let us now consider the case where ηi and ηj are on deeper layers, in which
case the previous proof does not hold. Let i = i1 × n + i2 and j = j1 × n + j2,
where i1 6= j1, or i2 6= j2, or both. Let also F be the filter of the considered
convolutional layer, of size k × k.
If ηi and ηj share the same hyperplane, then whenever z is such that Ciz+β =
0, we have that:
k∑
l=1
k∑
l=1
Fl,h
(
z(i1+l)×n+i2+h − z(j1+l)×n+j2+h
)
= 0 (1)
Since Eq. 1 needs to hold for all the z that are on the hyperplane, this equation
is very unlikely to hold.
Therefore, with a very high probability, no two neurons in the same layer
share the same hyperplane.
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6 Experiments
For our CNN approximating the identity – called Identity CNN from now on, we
consider a CNN with two hidden layers, 5× 5 filter sizes and ReLU activations.
We train this model over 10,000 random input of size 16× 16, and 200 runs. We
reach a mean absolute percentage error of 0.0913 between the input image and
the output of the CNN. We also trained a smaller CNN, with input shape 6× 6,
and trained over 200 runs. Apart from the input shape, this small CNN’s char-
acteristics are the same as the previous model. We only reach a mean absolute
percentage error of 0.52 between the input image and the output of the CNN
for the smaller model. We denote the first CNN IDl and the second one IDs.
We consider as an example a FCN (see Fig.3) with three hidden layers –
with respectively 512, 512 and 32 neurons – for the victim model, trained for
image classification. We trained the model over two datasets: MNIST and CI-
FAR10 [13,12]. This model’s accuracy reaches a 97.9% accuracy on MNIST, and
99.6% on CIFAR10 (but only 51.7% accuracy on CIFAR10 testing set, due to
overfitting).
We evaluate the accuracy of the victim model after adding CNNs following
the 8 cases:
1. IDl after the first layer, on the first 16× 16 neurons
2. IDs after the first layer, on the first 6× 6 neurons
3. IDl after the first layer on the first 16 × 16 neurons, as well as IDl on the
last 16× 16 neurons
4. IDl after the second layer, on the first 16× 16 neurons
5. IDs after the second layer, on the first 6× 6 neurons
6. IDl after the second layer, on the first 16 × 16 neurons, as well as IDl on
the last 16× 16 neurons
7. IDl after the first layer, on the first 16×16 neurons, and IDl after the second
layer, on the first 16× 16 neurons
8. IDl after the first layer, on the first 16×16 neurons, and IDl after the second
layer, on the last 16× 16 neurons
On the model trained on MNIST, the accuracy does not change in any of
the aforementioned cases. On the CIFAR10 dataset, the accuracy experiences a
slight drop, as summarized in Table 1.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce a simple but effective countermeasure to thwart
the recent wave of attacks [4,14,15,10] aiming at the extraction of NN models
through an oracle access.
As a line of further research, we want to investigate the gain we get by mount-
ing these attacks over quantized NNs [8,6,5,20,9]. Indeed, in the non-quantized
case, a great care should be taken dealing with floating point imprecision with
real numbers machine representation, as reported, for instance, by [4]. Today,
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Table 1. Accuracy on CIFAR10 (testing and training datasets ) of the victim model
when CNNs are added as described in Sec. 6.
Dataset
Original
Accu-
racy
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 Case 7 Case 8
CIFAR10
Testing Set
51.7 % 51.6% 51.69% 51.62% 51.2% 51.7% 50.8% 51.06% 51.27%
CIFAR10
Training Set
99.69% 99.5% 99.69% 99.09% 99.6% 99.69% 99.29% 99.28% 99.32%
Quantized NNs share almost the same accuracy as the floating-point ones. By
doing that, we are coming a step closer to differential cryptanalysis [2] performed
against symmetric ciphers and which serves as an inspiration of [4]. While our
protection will still be relevant, we want to explore more cryptographic tech-
niques as alternatives.
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